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sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential
internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the eco-
nomic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of
the product.
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Section of Antitrust Law
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Report on Know-How License
Agreements
RECOMMENDATION
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association recommends
to the Commission of the European Communities that it modify its draft
regulation on the application of Article 85(3) of the Rome Treaty to certain
categories of know-how licensing agreements so as (1) to expand the scope
of know-how license agreements covered by such regulation, (2) to extend
the periods permitted by such regulation for restrictions in, and payments
under, know-how license agreements, (3) to adopt approaches to such
agreements similar to those adopted by U.S. courts, and (4) to make other
minor changes of a technical or clarifying nature.
REPORT
1. Introduction and Background
The Antitrust Section, together with the International Law Section and
the Patent Section, which Sections fully support this Recommendation
and Report, have been concerned for some years that overly strict rules
on the part of the European Economic Community ("the EEC") with
respect to the licensing of know-how could inhibit the flow of technology
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to and from American companies because of concern and uncertainty on
the part of these companies that licensing arrangements permissible in
the U.S. would be considered as restrictions on competition in violation
of Article 85(1) of the Rome Treaty. Unlike U.S. antitrust rules, which
permit the application of rule of reason tests to such arrangements, the
EEC has taken the position that there is no rule of reason test under
Article 85(1) and that know-how license agreements may only be ex-
empted from the scope of Article 85 through the specific grant of an
exemption by the Commission, pursuant to its authority under Article
85(3). As stated at the 1985 London meeting of the ABA by Christopher
Bellamy, an attorney practicing in the European Economic Community:
Every antitrust system, as we all know, faces the problem of deciding what is
a prohibited restraint of trade and what restraints of trade are "to be permitted."
In the United States, as I understand it, that dilemma is solved by a combination
of per se rules and rule of reason rules. In the Community in Europe, we have
a quite different structure: we have a wide prohibition on restrictions on com-
petition under Article 85(I), but a provision for exemption from that prohibition
under Article 85(3). The problem is that exemption under Article 85(3) is an
administrative act by the Commission in Brussels; (54 Antitrust L.J. 612 (1985))
Based upon the view that the elimination of unnecessary restrictions
on the international transfer of technology was of substantial importance
to technological growth within the United States and elsewhere, the An-
titrust Section in June 1985, after receiving blanket authority, recom-
mended to the Commission of the European Communities ("the
Commission") pursuant to a memorandum subsequently published at 55
Antitrust Law Journal 393 (1986) that the EEC issue a regulation setting
forth a group exemption under Article 85(3) for certain categories of know-
how license agreements. This memorandum made a number of recom-
mendations, generally based on U.S. antitrust principles, with respect to
the scope and content of such a regulation.
In August 1987, the Commission issued in draft form such a regulation
embodying a number of recommendations made by the Antitrust Section
in 1985 and has invited interested parties to submit comments on it. A
copy of this draft regulation is attached to this report. Although the in-
vitation from the Commission to submit comments calls for submission
of comments by December 1, 1987, the Commission staff has advised that
submission of comments by the American Bar Association at this date
would be both timely and welcome.
While the draft regulation has adopted a number of the recommenda-
tions contained in the Antitrust Section's 1985 memorandum, the Section
has concluded that it would be salutary for the American Bar Association
to recommend that the Commission make certain specific modifications
to the draft. These proposed modifications are summarized in the Rec-
ommendation and are set forth below in detail on a topic by topic basis.
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II. Analysis of Draft Regulation
and Details of Recommendation
A. DEFINITION OF KNOW-How (Recital No. 6)
It is, of course, important in a know-how license exemption regulation
to define know-how in such a manner that the definition includes infor-
mation supplied to licensees that is substantial and excludes "information
that is trivial or self-evident."
However, based on U.S. experience, it is necessary or desirable to
require as a definitive matter that the know-how both be substantial and
"necessary or of decisive importance." It may be very difficult for the
Commission or the courts to ascertain in an individual case whether
particular know-how is indeed necessary or of decisive importance. It is
the experience of U.S. attorneys involved in the licensing of know-how
that there is often a range and variety of know-how supplied under an
agreement and that even the engineers of the parties may differ as to
exactly which supplied know-how, if any, is necessary or crucial. Also,
inasmuch as the definition of know-how is a threshold question in deter-
mining whether a party is entitled to the benefits of this exemption, there
is a significant likelihood of disputes or litigation arising over this issue.
In the event that one of the parties to a know-how license seeks to enforce
a restriction under the agreement in a national court the other party may
well try to focus on the "decisiveness" of the know-how, thus adding a
complicating and, we believe, unnecessary issue to the proceedings.
Substantively, U.S. courts have not found it difficult to determine whether
there is in fact know-how for the purposes of determining whether there
is an antitrust violation. In CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon, 769 F.2d 842 (1st Cir.
1985), a U.S. Court of Appeals was able to confirm without particular
difficulty, where a trade secret claim was asserted, that no trade secrets
did in fact exist. In sum, we believe that the Commission can properly
protect the Community against restrictive trade practices arising out of
non-bona fide know-how licenses without going so far as to require that
the parties be in a position to prove that the know-how is "necessary or
of decisive importance."
B. DURATION OF RESTRICTIONS AND AGREEMENTS (Art. 3(10))
Article 3(2) of the patent license group exemption precludes an ex-
emption for a patent license agreement where the agreement is automat-
ically prolonged beyond the expiration of existing licensed patents "by
the inclusion in it of any new patent obtained by licensor," absent a right
to terminate. Article 3(10) of the draft know-how license group exemption,
using language that parallels that in the patent license regulation, precludes
an exemption for a know-how license agreement where the agreement is
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automatically prolonged beyond seven years "by the inclusion in it of
any improvements obtained by the licensor," absent a right on the part
of the licensee to terminate or to refuse new improvements at the end of
the seven-year period. For the reasons discussed below, it is questionable
whether, as a matter of legal analysis or public policy, the patent license
approach should be extended to know-how licensing in this area. The
seven-year limitation should be eliminated or substantially extended.
Significant know-how license agreements may reasonably require a'du-
ration at least as long as that of a patent license to fully implement the
licensed technology and improvements that may be made by the licensor.
U.S. judicial acquiescence in restrictions of such long duration is reflected
in at least two U.S. cases which upheld territorial restrictions on imports
and exports for periods in the neighborhood of twenty years and longer
upon a finding that know-how was continuing to be supplied under the
agreements. See United States v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F.
Supp. 41, 218-22 (D. Del. 1953, aff'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377
(1956) (license since 1923 involving cellophane); Foundry Services, Inc.
v. Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953) (license since 1934). If the final regulation
retains the seven-year limitation, the licensee may be prevented from
obtaining important know-how developed by the licensor well into the
term of the license, relating to cost, quality improvements and other types
of improvements. While the regulation would permit the continuation of
the restrictions if the licensee is agreeable at the end of the seven-year
period, as a practical matter, if the licensor were required to permit the
licensee to terminate or refuse improvements after the seven years, the
licensor would surely insist on the same right of terminating the flow of
know-how for itself at the end of the seven-year period.
As indicated by the AOIP-Beyrard case, there is an antitrust nexus to
a provision in the patent license regulation which precludes an exemption
where, in effect, a patent may be used as leverage to extend the license
beyond the life of the patent. However, unlike a patent, which represents
a right to exclude granted by statute, know-how, by definition, does not
benefit from any such statutory right. As the Commission specifically
recognizes in the preamble to the draft regulation, "where know-how is
concerned . . . there can be no question of abuse of a legal monopoly"
(Recital 21).
Also, if the parties are required to renegotiate after a short period, they
will be reluctant to cooperate with each other in further development of
the licensed technology. As the Commission is aware, the U.S. has re-
moved the threat of treble damages in license agreements without regard
to their duration, which arise out of joint research activities. See National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C.A. Secs. 4301-4305.
FALL 1988
934 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Even if a substantially longer period were permitted, it would not pro-
vide unconditional flexibility to the parties of the agreement inasmuch as
the Commission would retain the right under the general provisions of
Article 9 of the draft regulation to withdraw the benefits of the regulation
at any time that the effect of an agreement became incompatible with
Article 85(3).
In one aspect, Article 3(10) of the draft know-how license regulation
should be revised to make it more parallel to Article 3(2) of the patent
license regulation. The latter provision provides that the termination of
a patent license agreement shall not prejudice "the right of the licensor
to charge royalties for the full period during which the licensee continues
to use [the licensor's non-public] know-how . . ., even if that period ex-
ceeds the life of the patents." Afortiori, the licensor of know-how should
be permitted to collect for the use of its non-public know-how while it
continues to be used even if the parties are limited in their ability to renew
the agreement. Although such a right on the part of a know-how licensor
may be considered implied in the know-how regulation, it is desirable that
Article 3(10) be modified to expressly parallel the language of Article 3(2)
of the patent license regulation in this regard so as to avoid confusion.
C. PAYMENT ON KNOW-HOW WHICH HAS BECOME
PUBLIC (Arts. 2(9); 4(2)(9) and 9(6))
It does not help but rather hinders competition to place a three-year
limitation on payment on know-how which has become public without
fault of the licensor. U.S. courts, including the United States Supreme
Court (see Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979)), take
the view that an agreement freely entered into by the parties to pay on
publicly known know-how does not raise antitrust or other policy issues.
The analysis underlying such cases is that, since competitive restrictions
are not involved, the issue is essentially a financial matter between the
parties. Stated differently, we agree with the analysis but not the conclu-
sion set forth at Recital 21 of the draft regulation.
If a licensor is prohibited from collecting an ongoing stream of royalties
for more than three years after know-how has become public, it would
seem that the licensor would seek other approaches to maximizing its
income. This could involve the requirement of an initial lump sum pay-
ment, a refusal to license or a sale of the know-how. As to this last
alternative, the Commission's comment in support of post-term use bans
is instructive: "otherwise the licensor would be forced to transfer this
know-how in perpetuity and this could inhibit the transfer of technology."
(Recital 17).
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When the European Court of Justice addressed the analogous issue of
payment on unpatented parts in the Windsurfing case, the Court saw no
difference from a competitive perspective if the licensee paid 5 percent
on a combination of patented and unpatented parts or 15 percent on only
the patented part, where the total amount paid was the same in each case.
The conclusion of the European Court of Justice that Article 85(l) did
not apply in the above situation seems to dictate the elimination of the
three-year limit on payments in the know-how license regulation. Pre-
sumably, the licensor has a certain value that it can extract from the
know-how and if the logical approach of an ongoing per unit royalty is
barred to it, it will seek other approaches, which may well be more re-
strictive. Also, as noted in the preceding section, the general provisions
of Article 9 remain available to the Commission to permit withdrawal of
the exemption if the payment approach were to become restrictive.
The issue of enforceability of payment obligations for licensing of know-
how is also a matter of concern. Under the approach set forth in the draft
regulation, a licensee would have the right to assert in a proceeding seeking
payment in a national court that key elements of the know-how have been
public for more than three years. One could envision a complicated trial
on the issue of whether and to what extent know-how had become public
through the sale of product or otherwise. The resolution of the payment
issue could then possibly be further delayed until the European Court of
Justice had ruled on the matter. The provisions in the draft regulation
permitting notice to the Commission under Article 4(2)(a), and the ex-
emption that would arise if the Commission took no action within six
months thereafter, may not be a meaningful solution to this problem in
that, as the Commission recognizes, a head start in time may be a key
element in the value of the know-how. See Quick Point, supra. The Com-
mission should further consider from a competitive perspective whether
the best result for the Community might be the total elimination of the
three-year limitation on payments.
D. MISCELLANEOUS KNow-HOw AND
PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS
The draft regulation focuses on various types of mixed license agree-
ments. It is suggested that the Commission also consider the situation
where the license covers necessary patents together with know-how suf-
ficient to meet the standards of the know-how regulation. Licenses of this
type may occur fairly frequently and, in view of the magnitude of the
technology transferred, should be encouraged. The regulation should spe-
cifically provide in such a case that the know-how is covered by this
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regulation and the patents by the patent regulation. This would provide
the parties with appropriate flexibility for such a situation.
Imports into the Common Market
Numerous cases and commentators in the United States confirm that,
absent a cartel, a U.S. company may provide in its license agreements
that the foreign licensee is granted no license under the licensor's know-
how or patents to sell into the United States. See, for example, Hawk,
U.S., Common Market and International Antitrust, 388-96 (2nd Ed. 1986).
It would appear that the patent license and know-how license regulations
support a similar approach with respect to the grant of licenses wherein
a Community licensor excludes the whole of the EEC from the scope of
the non-EEC licensee's sales license: the sanctions of Article 3(12)(b) of
the draft know-how license only apply to "products which have been put
on the market within the common market by the licensor or with his
consent." However, Recital 12 creates some confusion in this regard by
suggesting that there can only be "exclusive licenses for a territory cov-
ering the whole of the common market where there is the possibility of
parallel imports from third countries." The extension of the parallel import
doctrine to third countries-which appears inconsistent with European
Court of Justice case law under Article 30-would discourage licensing
where the licensor wished to fully reserve its home market, either the
EEC or a non-EEC country, to itself.
Know-How Grantbacks
Under Article 3(2)(c) of the draft regulation, no exemption is permitted
for a post-term use ban "if the licensor's right to use the improvement is
of longer duration than the licensee's right to use the original know-how."
Under this provision, as we understand it, if the licensor receives a grant-
back of know-how of indefinite duration, no exemption will be permitted
unless the licensee is granted a similar indefinite right.
Different issues are involved in the grantback of know-how rights than
are involved in the imposition of post-term use bans and that the two
should not be coupled. In the normal course of the administration of a
know-how license, it is likely that some of the licensee's own know-how
will become commingled with that of the licensor. For this reason, licen-
sors will normally insist on a right that is unlimited in time to use the
licensee's know-how so as to be sure of their continuing right to use their
own know-how. A post-term use ban involves a basic and different issue
of whether a licensor may have the right to place a durational limit on
the use by the licensee of the licensor's know-how. The two are different
issues and should not be confused. Accordingly, Article 3(2)(c) [should]
be deleted.
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Defense
U.S. antitrust jurisprudence recognizes that special factors may exist
with respect to agreements with the government in the defense area. The
government is, of course, a monopsonist in purchasing for defense and
may have special interests which dictate arrangements that would not be
permissible in the commercial arena. In the United States, such arrange-
ments receive little note since the same government is responsible for
defense procurement and antitrust enforcement. Since this is not the case
in the EEC, it would be desirable to expressly provide that know-how
license agreements in the defense area granting manufacturing licenses
limited to a particular country which are approved by the defense au-
thority of that country be considered outside of the scope of this regulation
and Article 85(1).
III. Conclusions
Modification by the Commission of the draft know-how license regu-
lation in accordance with the Recommendation would encourage greater
licensing of know-how between companies in this country and in the EEC.
In view of the importance of technological development to economic
growth, increased licensing should have salutary economic effects both
in the U.S. and in the EEC.
The key element in the Recommendation and the Report is that mod-
ification by the Commission of the draft regulation in ways that would
permit greater flexibility would increase the incentive for licensing know-
how in the same manner as the rule of reason antitrust approach utilized
by the U.S. courts increases incentives for such licensing in the United
States.
Respectfully submitted,
James F. Rill
Chairman
January 1988
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